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ABSTRACT
Recent aacks on federated learning demonstrate that keeping the
training data on clients’ devices does not provide sucient privacy,
as the model parameters shared by clients can leak information
about their training data. A secure aggregation protocol enables
the server to aggregate clients’ models in a privacy-preserving
manner. However, existing secure aggregation protocols incur high
computation/communication costs, especially when the number of
model parameters is larger than the number of clients participating
in an iteration – a typical scenario in federated learning.
In this paper, we propose a secure aggregation protocol, Fast-
SecAgg, that is ecient in terms of computation and communi-
cation, and robust to client dropouts. e main building block of
FastSecAgg is a novel multi-secret sharing scheme, FastShare,
based on the Fast Fourier Transform (FFT), which may be of inde-
pendent interest. FastShare is information-theoretically secure,
and achieves a trade-o between the number of secrets, privacy
threshold, and dropout tolerance. Riding on the capabilities of
FastShare, we prove that FastSecAgg is (i) secure against the
server colluding with any subset of some constant fraction (e.g.
∼ 10%) of the clients in the honest-but-curious seing; and (ii) tol-
erates dropouts of a random subset of some constant fraction (e.g.
∼ 10%) of the clients. FastSecAgg achieves signicantly smaller
computation cost than existing schemes while achieving the same
(orderwise) communication cost. In addition, it guarantees security
against adaptive adversaries, which can perform client corruptions
dynamically during the execution of the protocol.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→ Privacy-preserving protocols;
KEYWORDS
secret sharing, secure aggregation, federated learning, machine
learning, data sketching, privacy-preserving protocols
1 INTRODUCTION
Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that
enables a large number of clients to coordinate with a central server
to learn a shared model while keeping all the training data on clients’
devices. In particular, training a neural net in a federated manner
is an iterative process. In each iteration of FL, the server selects a
A shorter version of this paper has been accepted in ICML Workshop on Federated
Learning for User Privacy and Data Condentiality, July 2020, and CCS Workshop on
Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning in Practice, November 2020.
subset of clients, and sends them the current global model. Each
client runs several steps of mini-batch stochastic gradient descent,
and communicates its model update—the dierence between the
local model and the received global model—to the server. e server
aggregates the model updates from the clients to obtain an improved
global model, and moves to the next iteration.
FL ensures that every client keeps their local data on their own
device, and sends only model updates that are functions of their
dataset. Even though any update cannot contain more information
than the client’s local dataset, the updates may still leak signicant
information making them vulnerable to inference and inversion
aacks [17, 19, 33, 40]. Even well-generalized deep models such as
DenseNet can leak a signicant amount of information about their
training data [33]. In fact, certain neural networks (e.g., generative
text models) trained on sensitive data (e.g., private text messages)
can memorize the training data [13].
Secure aggregation protocols can be used to provide strong pri-
vacy guarantees in FL. At a high level, secure aggregation is a secure
multi-party computation (MPC) protocol that enables the server
to compute the sum of clients’ model updates without learning
any information about any client’s individual update [9]. Secure
aggregation can be eciently composed with dierential privacy
to further enhance privacy guarantees [9, 22, 45].
e secure aggregation problem for securely computing the
summation has received signicant research aention in the past
few years, see [22] for a survey. However, the FL setup presents
unique challenges for a secure aggregation protocol [8, 28]:
(1) Massive scale: Up to 10,000 users can be selected to partici-
pate in an iteration.
(2) Communication costs: Model updates can be high-dimensional
vectors, e.g., the ResNet model consists of hundreds of mil-
lions of parameters [23].
(3) Dropouts: Clients are mobile devices which can drop out at
any point. e percentage of dropouts can go up to 10%.
(4) Privacy: It is crucial to provide strongest possible privacy
guarantees since malicious servers can launch powerful at-
tacks by using sybils [14], wherein the adversary simulates
a large number of fake client devices [18].
Due to these challenges, existing secure aggregation protocols
for FL [3, 9, 43, 45, 47] either incur heavy computation and commu-
nication costs or provide only weaker forms of privacy guarantees,
which limits their scalability (see Table 1).
Secret sharing [2] is an elegant primitive that is used as a build-
ing block in a large number of secure summation (and in general
secure MPC) protocols, see, e.g., [15, 22]. Secret sharing based
secure aggregation protocols are oen more ecient than other
approaches such as homomorphic encryption and Yao’s garbled
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SecAgg [9] O (LN 2) O (LN + N 2) O (LN + N 2) O (L + N ) Adaptive Worst-case
TurboAgg [43] O (L logN log2 logN ) O (LN logN ) O (L logN log2 logN ) O (L logN ) Non-adaptive Average-case
SecAgg+ [3] O (LN logN + N log2 N ) O (LN + N logN ) O (L logN + log2 N ) O (L + logN ) Non-adaptive Average-case
FastSecAgg O (L logN ) O (LN + N 2) O (L logN ) O (L + N ) Adaptive Average-case
Table 1: Comparison of the proposed FastSecAgg with SecAgg [9], TurboAgg [43], and SecAgg+ [3]. Here N is the total
number of clients and L is the length of model updates (i.e., client inputs). An adaptive adversary can choose which clients to
corrupt during the protocol execution, whereas the corruptions happen before the protocol execution starts for a non-adaptive
adversary. Worst-case (resp. average-case) dropout guarantee ensures that any (resp. a random) subset of clients of a bounded
size may drop out without aecting the correctness and security. TurboAgg requires at least logN rounds, which increases
the overheads. e protocols in [45, 47] assume a trusted third party for key distribution (see Sec. 5.3 for details).
circuits [1, 11, 22]. However, naı¨vely using the popular Shamir’s
secret sharing scheme [39] for aggregating length-L updates from
N clients incurs O (LN 2) communication and computation cost,
which is intractable at the envisioned scale of FL.
In this paper, we propose FastShare—a novel secret sharing
scheme based on a nite-eld version of the Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT)—that is designed to leverage the FL setup. FastShare is
a multi-secret sharing scheme, which can simultaneously share S
secrets to N clients such that (i) it is information-theoretically
secure against a collusion of any subset of some constant fraction
(e.g. ∼ 10%) of the clients; and (ii) with overwhelming probability, it
is able to recover the secrets with O (N logN ) complexity even if a
random subset of some constant fraction (e.g. ∼ 10%) of the clients
drop out. In general, FashShare can achieve a trade-o between
the security and dropout parameters (see eorem 3.3); thresholds
of 10% are chosen to be well-suited in the FL setup. We note that a
larger number of arbitrary (or even adversarial) dropouts does not
aect security, and may only result in a failure to recover the secrets
(i.e, aects only correctness). FastShare uses ideas from sparse-
graph codes [27, 29, 38] and crucially exploits insights derived from
a spectral view of codes [6, 34], which enables us to prove strong
privacy guarantees.
Using FastShare as a building block, we propose FastSecAgg
– a scalable secure aggregation protocol for FL that has low com-
putation and communication costs and strong privacy guarantees
(see Table 1 for a comparison of costs). FastSecAgg achieves low
costs by riding on the capabilities of FastShare and leveraging
the following unique aribute of FL. Privacy breaches in FL are
inicted by malicious/adversarial actors (e.g., a server using sybils),
requiring worst-case guarantees; whereas dropouts occur due to
non-adversarial/natural causes (e.g., system dynamics and wireless
outages) [8], making statistical or average-case guarantees sucient.
FastShare achieves O (N logN ) computation cost by relaxing the
dropout constraint from worst-case to random.
For N clients, each having a length-L update vector, FastSecAgg
requires O (L logN ) computation and O (LN + N 2) communica-
tion at the server, and O (L logN ) computation and O (L + N ) com-
munication per client. We compare the costs and setups with ex-
isting protocols in Table 1 (see Sec. 5.3 for details). We point out
that the computation cost at the server was observed to be the key
barrier to scalability in [8, 9]. FastSecAgg signicantly reduces the
computation cost at the server as compared to prior works. When
the length of model updates L is larger than the number of clients
N , FastSecAgg achieves the same (order-wise) communication
cost as the prior works. We note that, in typical FL applications,
the number of model parameters (L) is in millions, whereas the
number of clients (N ) is up to tens of thousands [8, 32]. In addition,
FastSecAgg guarantees security against an adaptive adversary,
which can corrupt clients adaptively during the execution of the
protocol. is is in contrast with the protocols in [3, 43], which are
secure only against non-adaptive (or static) adversaries, wherein
client corruptions happen before the protocol executions begins.
We note that, although FastShare secret sharing scheme is
inspired from the federated learning setup, it may be of independent
interest. In fact, FastShare is a cryptographic primitive that can be
used for secure aggregation (and secure multi-party computation in
general) in wide applications including smart meters [26], medical
data collection [12], and syndromic surveillance [46].
2 PROBLEM SETUP AND PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Federated Learning
We consider the setup in which a xed set of M clients, each having
their local dataset, coordinate with the server to jointly train a
model. e i-th client’s data is sampled from a distributionDi . e
federated learning problem can be formalized as minimizing a sum
of stochastic functions dened as
arg min
w∈Rd
{
`(w) = 1
M
M∑
i=1
`i (w)
}
, (1)
where `i (w) = Eζ ∼Di [`i (w; ζ )] is the expected loss of the predic-
tion on the i-th client’s data made with model parameters w.
Federated Averaging (FedAvg) is a synchronous update scheme
that proceeds in rounds of communication [32]. At the beginning
of each round (called iteration), the server selects a subset C of N
clients (for some N ≤ M). Each of these clients i ∈ C copies the
current model parameters wti,0 = w
t , and performsT steps of (mini-
batch) stochastic gradient descent steps to obtain its local model
wti,T ; each local step k is of the form w
t
i,k ← wti,k−1 − ηlдti,k−1,
where дti,k−1 is an unbiased stochastic gradient of `i at w
t
i,k−1,
2
and ηl is the local step-size.1 en, each client i ∈ C sends their
update as ∆wti = w
t
i,L − wt . At the server, the clients’ updates
∆wti are aggregated to form the new server model as w
t+1 = wt +
1
|C |
∑
i ∈C ∆wti .
Our focus is on one iteration of FedAvg and we omit the explicit
dependence on the iteration t hereaer. We assume that each client
potentially compresses and suitably quantizes their model update
∆wti ∈ Rd to obtain ui ∈ ZLR , where L ≤ d . Our goal is to design a
protocol that enables the server to securely compute
∑
i ∈C ui . We
describe the threat model and the objectives in the next section.
2.2 reat Model
Federated learning can be considered as a multi-party computation
consisting of N parties (i.e., the clients), each having their own
private dataset, and an aggregator (i.e., the server), with the goal of
learning a model using all of the datasets.
Honest-but-curious model: e parties honestly follow the pro-
tocol, but aempt to learn about the model updates from other
parties by using the messages exchanged during the execution of
the protocol. e honest-but-curious (aka semi-honest) adversarial
model is commonly used in the eld of secure MPC, including prior
works on secure federated learning [9, 43, 45].
Colluding parties: In every iteration of federated averaging, the
server rst samples a set C of clients. e server may collude with
any set of up to T clients from C. e server can view the internal
state and all the messages received/sent by the clients with whom
it colludes. We refer to the internal state along with the messages
received/sent by colluding parties (including the server) as their
joint view. (see Sec. 5.1 for details)
Dropouts: A random subset of up to D clients may drop out at any
point of time during the execution of secure aggregation.
Objective: Our objective is to design a protocol to securely aggre-
gate clients’ model updates such that the joint view of the server
and any set of up to T clients must not leak any information about
the other clients’ model updates, besides what can be inferred from
the output of the summation. In addition, even if a random set of
up to D clients drop out during an iteration, the server with high
probability should be able to compute the sum of model updates
(of the surviving clients) while maintaining the privacy. We refer
to T as the privacy threshold and D as the dropout tolerance.
2.3 Cryptographic Primitives
2.3.1 Key Agreement. A key agreement protocol consists of
three algorithms (KA.param, KA.gen, KA.agree). Given a se-
curity parameter λ, the parameter generation algorithm pp ←
KA.param(λ) generates some public parameters, over which the
protocol will be parameterized. e key generation algorithm al-
lows a client i to generate a private-public key pair (pki , ski ) ←
KA.gen(pp). e key agreement procedure allows clients i and j
to obtain a private shared key ki, j ← KA.agree(ski , pkj ). Correct-
ness requires that, for any key pairs generated by clients i and j
1In practice, clients can make multiple training passes (called epochs) over its local
dataset with a given step size. Further, typically client datasets are of dierent size,
and the server takes a weighted average with weight of a client proportional to the
size of its dataset. See [32] for details.
(using KA.gen with the same parameterspp), KA.agree(ski , pkj ) =
KA.agree(skj , pki ). Security requires that there exists a simulator
SimKA, which takes as input an output key sampled uniformly at
random and the public key of the other client, and simulates the
messages of the key agreement execution such that the simulated
messages are computationally indistinguishable from the protocol
transcript.
2.3.2 Authenticated Encryption. An authenticated encryption
allows two parties to communicate with data condentially and
data integrity. It consists of an encryption algorithm AE.enc that
takes as input a key and a message and outputs a ciphertext, and a
decryption algorithm AE.dec that takes as input a ciphertext and
a key and outputs the original plaintext, or a special error symbol
⊥. For correctness, we require that for all keys ki ∈ {0, 1}λ and
all messagesm, AE.dec ((ki ,AE.enc(ki ,m)) =m. For security, we
require semantic security under a chosen plaintext aack (IND-
CPA) and ciphertext integrity (IND-CTXT) [4].
3 FASTSHARE: FFT BASED SECRET SHARING
In this section, we present a novel, computationally ecient multi-
secret sharing scheme FastShare which forms the core of our
proposed secure aggregation protocol FastSecAgg (described in
the next section).
A multi-secret sharing scheme splits a set of secrets into shares
(with one share per client) such that coalitions of clients up to
certain size have no information on the secrets, and a random2 set
of clients of large enough size can jointly reconstruct the secrets
from their shares. In particular, we consider information-theoretic
(perfect) security. A secret sharing scheme is said to be linear
if any linear combination of valid share-vectors result in a valid
share-vector of the linear combination applied to the respective
secret-vectors. We summarize this in the following denition.
Denition 3.1 (Multi-secret Sharing). Let Fq be a nite eld, and
let S , T , D and N be positive integers such that S +T + D < N ≤ q.
A linear multi-secret sharing scheme over Fq consists of two algo-
rithms Share and Recon. e sharing algorithm {(i, [s]i )}i ∈C ←
Share(s,C) is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a set
of secrets s ∈ FSq and a set C of N clients (client-IDs), and pro-
duces a set of N shares, each in Fq , where share [s]i is assigned
to client i in C. For a set D ⊆ C, the reconstruction algorithm
{s,⊥} ← Recon
(
{(i, [s]i )}i ∈C\D
)
takes as input the shares cor-
responding to C \ D, and outputs either a set of S eld elements
s or a special symbol ⊥. e scheme should satisfy the following
requirements.
(1) T -Privacy: For all s, s′ ∈ FSq and every P ⊂ C of size at
mostT , the shares of s and s′ restricted to P are identically
distributed.
(2) D-Dropout-Resilience: For every s ∈ FSq and any random
setD ⊂ C of size at most D, Recon
(
{(i, [s]i )}i ∈C\D
)
= s
with probability at least 1 − poly(N ).
2Secret sharing [2] and multi-secret sharing [7, 16] schemes conventionally consider
worst-case dropouts. We consider random dropouts to exploit the FL setup.
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Figure 1: FastShare to generate shares, and FastRecon to
recover the secrets from a subset of shares.
(3) Linearity: If {(i, [s1]i )}i ∈C and {(i, [s2]i )}i ∈C are sharings
of s1 and s2, then {(i,a [s1]i + b [s2]i )}i ∈C is a sharing of
as1 + bs2 for any a,b ∈ Fq .
Next, we describe FastShare which can achieve a trade-o
between S , T , and D for a given N . We begin with seing up the
necessary notation. FastShare leverages the nite-eld Fourier
transform and Chinese Remainder eorem. Towards this end, let
{n0,n1} be co-prime positive integers of the same order, such that
n0n1 divides (q−1). Without loss of generality, assume that n0 < n1.
E.g., n0 = 10, n1 = 13, and q = 131. We consider N of the form
N = n0n1, and choose the eld size q as a power of a prime such
that N divides q − 1. By the co-primeness of n0 and n1, applying
the Chinese Remainder eorem, any number j ∈ {0, · · · ,n − 1}
can be uniquely represented in a 2-dimensional (2D) grid as a tuple
(a,b) where a = j mod n0 and b = j mod n1.
3.1 FastShare to Generate Shares
e sharing algorithm {(i, [s]i )}i ∈C ← FastShare(s,C) is a prob-
abilistic algorithm that takes as input a set of secrets s ∈ FSq , and a
set C of N clients (client-IDs), and produces a set of N shares, each
in Fq , where share [s]i is assigned to client i . At a high level, Fast-
Share consists of two stages. First, it constructs a length-N “signal”
consisting of the secrets and random masks with zeros placed at
judiciously chosen locations. Second, it takes the fast Fourier trans-
form of the signal to generate the shares (see Fig. 1). e shares
can be considered as the “spectrum” of the signal constructed in
the rst stage.
In particular, the “signal” is constructed as follows. Given frac-
tions δ0,δ1,α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1/2), we dene the sets of tuples
Z0,Z1, S, and T using the grid representation as depicted in Fig. 2.
We give the formal denitions below. Here, we round any real num-
ber to the largest integer no larger than it, i.e., round x to bxc, and
omit the oor sign for the sake of brevity.
Z0 = {(a,b) : 0 ≤ a ≤ δ0n0 − 1} , (2)
Z1 = {(a,b) : 0 ≤ b ≤ δ1n1 − 1} , (3)
S = {(a,b) : δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 ≤ a ≤ n0 − 1,
δ1n1 + β(1 − δ1)n1 ≤ b ≤ δ1n1 + (1 − β)(1 − δ1)n1} , (4)
T = {(a,b) : δ0n0 ≤ a ≤ δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 − 1,
δ1n1 + (1 − β)(1 − δ1)n1 ≤ b ≤ n1 − 1} . (5)
We place zeros at indices inZ0 andZ1, and secrets at indices S.
Each of the remaining indices is assigned a uniform random mask
from Fq (independent of other masks and the secrets). We use T
𝛿
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Figure 2: Indices assigned to a grid using the Chinese re-
mainder theorem, and sets Z0, Z1, S, and T . Here, we de-
ne n′i = (1 − δi )ni for i ∈ {0, 1}. Set S is used for secrets,
and sets Z0 and Z1 are used for zeros, and the remaining
locations are used for random masks. Set T is used in our
privacy proof.
in our privacy proof. Let x denote the resulting length-N vector,
which we refer to as the “signal”. (See Fig. 3 for a toy example.)
Let ω be a primitive N -th root of unity in Fq . FastShare com-
putes the (fast) Fourier transform X of the signal x generated by
ω.3 e coecients of X represent shares of s, i.e., [s]i = Xi . e
details are given in Algorithm 1.
3.2 FastRecon to Reconstruct the Secrets
Let D ⊆ C denote a random subset of size at most D. e recon-
struction algorithm {s,⊥} ← FastRecon
(
{(i, [s]i )}i ∈C\D
)
takes
as input the shares corresponding to C \ D, and outputs either
a set of S eld elements s or a special symbol ⊥. At a high level,
FastRecon consists of two stages. First, it iteratively recovers all
the missing shares by leveraging a linear-relationship between the
shares (as described next). Second, it takes the inverse Fourier
transform of the shares (i.e., the “spectrum”) to obtain the “signal”,
which contains the secrets at appropriate locations (see Fig. 1).
e key ingredient of FastRecon is a computationally ecient
iterative algorithm, rooted in the eld of coding theory, to recover
the missing shares. Towards this end, we show that the shares
satisfy certain “parity-check” constraints, which are induced by the
careful placement of zeros in x. (See Fig. 3 for a toy example.)
Lemma 3.2. Let {X j }N−1j=0 denote the shares produced by the Fast-
Share scheme for an arbitrary secret s. en, for each i ∈ {0, 1}, for
every c ∈ {0, 1, . . . , Nni } and v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1}, it holds that
ni−1∑
u=0
ω
−uv Nni Xu Nni +c
= 0. (6)
3See Appendix A for a brief overview of the nite eld Fourier transform.
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Figure 3: Example with ` = 4 secrets, and co-prime integers
n0 = 5, n1 = 6, yielding N = n0n1 = 30. Zeros are placed
at gray locations, and the secrets at blue locations. Careful
zero padding induces parity checks on the shares in each row
and column due to aliasing, i.e., [X0 + X5 + · · · + X25;X1 +
· · · + X26; · · · ;X4 + · · · + X29] = [0, · · · , 0] and [X0 + X6 + · · · +
X24; · · · ;X5 + · · · + X29] = [0, · · · , 0]. Any one missing share
in a row or column can be recovered using the parity-check
structure. E.g., dropped out red shares can be recovered by
iteratively decoding themissing shares in rows and columns.
e proof essentially follows from the subsampling and aliasing
properties of the Fourier transform and is deferred to Appendix B.
Remark 1. When translated in coding theory parlance, the above
lemma essentially states that the shares form a codeword of a product
code with Reed-Solomon component codes [31]. In particular, when
the shares are represented on a 2D-grid using the Chinese remainder
theorem, each row (resp. column) forms a codeword of a Reed-Solomon
code with block-length n0 (resp. n1) and dimension (1 − δ0)n0 (resp.
(1−δ1)n1). In other words, X¯c =
[
Xc X N
ni
+c · · · X(ni−1) Nni +c
]
is a codeword of an (ni , (1 − δi )ni ) Reed-Solomon code for every
c = 0, 1, . . . ,N /ni − 1. To see this, observe that when the constraints
in (6), for a xed c , are wrien in a matrix form, the resulting matrix
is a Vandermonde matrix, and it is straightforward to show that X¯c
corresponds to the evaluations of a polynomial of degree (1−δi )ni − 1
at ω−uN /ni for u = 0, 1, . . . ,ni − 1. We present a comparison with
the Shamir’s scheme in Appendix F.
ese parity-check constraints on the shares make it possible to
iteratively recover missing shares from each row and column until
all the missing shares can be recovered. We present a toy example
for this in Fig. 3. It is worth noting that this way of recovering the
missing symbols of a codeword is known in coding theory as an
iterative (bounded distance) decoder [27, 38].
In particular, codewords of a Reed-Solomon code with block-
length ni and dimension (1 − δi )ni are evaluations of a polynomial
of degree at most (1−δi )ni−1. erefore, any δi fraction of erasures
can be recovered via polynomial interepolation. erefore, if a row
(resp. column) has less than δ0n0 (resp. δ1n1) missing shares, then
they can be recovered. is process is repeated for a xed number
if iterations, or until all the missing shares are recovered.
Algorithm 1 FastShare Secret Sharing
procedure FastShare(s,C)
parameters: nite eld Fq of size q, a primitive root of unity
ω in Fq , privacy threshold T , dropout resilience D
inputs: secret s ∈ FLq , set of N clients C (client-IDs)
initialize: setsZ0,Z1, S as per (2), (2), (4), respectively; an
arbitrary bijection σ : S → {0, 1, . . . , S − 1}
for j = 0 to n − 1 do
if j ∈ Z0 ∪Z1 then
x j ← 0
else if j ∈ S then
x j ← sσ (j) . si is the i-th coordinate of s
else
x j
$← Fq
end if
end for
X ← FFTω (x)
Output: {(i, [s]i )}i ∈C ← {(i,Xi )}N−1i=0
end procedure
procedure FastRecon({(i, [s]i )}i ∈R )
parameters: nite eld Fq of size q, a primitive root of unity
ω in Fq , privacy threshold T , dropout resilience D, number of
iterations J , bijection σ and set S used in FastShare
input: subset of shares with client-IDs {(i, [s]i )}i ∈R
for iterations j = 1 to J do
for rows r = 0 to n1 − 1 in parallel do
if r has fewer than δ0n0 missing shares then
Decode the missing share values by polynomial
interpolation
end if
end for
for columns c = 0 to n0 − 1 in parallel do
if c has fewer than δ1n1 missing shares then
Decode the missing share values by polynomial
interpolation
end if
end for
end for
if any missing share then
Output: ⊥
else
x← IFFTω (X)
Output: s← X(σ (S))
end if
end procedure
Puing things together, FastRecon rst uses an iterative de-
coder to obtain the missing shares. If the peeling decoder fails,
it outputs ⊥, and declares failure. Otherwise, it takes the inverse
(fast) Fourier transform of X (generated by ω) to obtain x. Finally,
it output the coordinates of x indexed by S (in the 2D-grid repre-
sentation) as the secret. e details are given in Algorithm 1.
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3.3 Analysis of FastShare
First, we analyze the security and correctness of FastShare in the
honest-but-curious seing. We defer the proof to Appendix C.
Theorem 3.3. Given fractions δ0,δ1,α ∈ (0, 1) and β ∈ (0, 1/2),
FastShare generatesN shares from S = (1−α)(1−2β)(1−δ0)(1−δ1)N
secrets such that it satises
(1) T -privacy for T = αβ(1 − δ0)(1 − δ1)N ,
(2) D-dropout resilience for D = (1 − (1 − δ0)(1 − δ1))N2 , and
(3) linearity.
For example, choosing α = 1/2, β = 1/4, δ0 = δ1 = 1/10, yields
S = 0.2N , T = 0.1N , and D = 0.095N .
Next, we present the computation cost in terms of the number
of (basic) arithmetic operations in Fq .
Computation Cost: FastShare runs in O (N logN ) time, since
constructing the signal takes O (N ) time and the Fourier transform
can be computed inO (N logN ) time using a Fast Fourier Transform
(FFT). FastRecon also runs inO(N logN ) time, when computations
are parallelized. Specically, recovering the missing shares in a
row or column of shares (when arranged in the 2D-grid) can be
done in O
(
n2i
)
= O (N ) complexity by leveraging that rows and
columns are Reed-Solomon codewords, which are evaluations of a
degree-(ni − δini − 1) polynomial. Since all rows and columns can
be decoded in parallel, and decoding is carried out for a constant
number of iterations, the iterative decoder runs in O (N ) time. e
second step is the inverse Fourier transform, which can be computed
in O (N logN ) time using an FFT.
Note that in practical FL scenarios, the number of clients typi-
cally scales up to ten thousand [8]. erefore, in order to gain full
parallelism, one needs to have
√
N ≈ 100 processors/cores. In the
next section, we present a variant of FastShare that removes the
requirement of parallelism for suciently large N . Moreover, this
variant also allows us to achieve a more favorable trade-o between
the number of shares, privacy threshold, and dropout tolerance.
3.4 Improving the Performance for Large
Number of Clients
FastShare ensures that when the shares are arranged in a 2D-
grid using the Chinese remainder theorem, each row and column
satises certain parity-check constraints (cf. Remark 1). As we
show next, when N is suciently large, it suces to ensure that
only rows (or columns) satisfy the parity-check constraints. In this
case, the FastShare algorithm remains the same as before except
for the placement of secrets, zeros, and random masks changes
slightly.
Let q be a power of a prime, and let N be a positive integer
such that N divides q − 1. Let c ≥ 1 be a constant. We consider
N of the form N = n0n1 such that n0 = c logN . Given fractions
δ0,α , β ∈ (0, 1), we dene the sets of tuplesZ0, S, and T using the
grid representation determined by the Chinese remainder theorem,
as depicted in Fig. 4. We give the formal denitions below. Note
that we round any rational number x to bxc, and omit the oor
sign for the sake of brevity.
Z0 = {(a,b) : 0 ≤ a ≤ δ0n0 − 1} , (7)
S = {(a,b) : δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 ≤ a ≤ n0 − 1,

𝛿
0
𝑛
0
𝛼𝑛
′
0
(1 − 𝛼)𝑛
′
0
𝛽𝑛
1
(1 − 𝛽)𝑛
1

0

mod 𝑛
0
mod 𝑛
1
Figure 4: Indices assigned to a grid, and sets Z, S, and T .
Here, we dene n′0 = (1 − δ0)n0. Set S is used for secrets, Z0
is used for zeros, and the remaining locations are used for
random masks. Set T is used in our privacy proof.
0 ≤ b ≤ (1 − β)n1} , (8)
T = {(a,b) : δ0n0 ≤ a ≤ δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 − 1,
(1 − β)n1 ≤ b ≤ n1 − 1} . (9)
We construct the signal by placing zeros at indices inZ0, and
secrets at indices in S. Each of the remaining indices is assigned a
uniform random mask from Fq (independent of other masks and
the secrets). We then take the Fourier transform (generated by a
primitive N -th root of unity in Fq ) of the signal to obtain the shares.
Using the same arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.2, it is
straightforward to show that, for every c ∈ {0, . . . ,n1 − 1} and
v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,δ0n0 − 1}, it holds that
n0−1∑
u=0
ω−uvn1Xun1+c = 0. (10)
When translated in coding theory parlance, the above condition
states that when the shares are represented in a 2D-grid using the
Chinese remainder theorem, then each row forms a codeword of a
Reed-Solomon code with block-lengthn0 and dimension (1−δ0)n0.4
FastRecon rst recovers the missing shares by decoding each
row. If every row has less than δ0 fraction of erasures, then it re-
covers all the missing shares. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥, and declares
failure. Next, it takes the inverse (fast) Fourier transform of the
shares to obtain the signal. e coordinates of the signal indexed
by S (in the 2D-grid representation) gives the secrets.
Security and Correctness: Given fractions δ0,α , β ∈ (0, 1), this
variant of FastShare generates N shares from
S = (1 − α)(1 − β)(1 − δ0)N (11)
4We note that this variant of FastShare is related to a class of erasure codes called
Locally Recoverable Codes (LRCs) (see [21, 37, 44], and references therein). See Ap-
pendix F for details.
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secrets such that it satises T -privacy for
T = αβ(1 − δ0)N , (12)
D-dropout-resilience for
D = δ0N (13)
and linearity. (e proof is similar to eorem 3.3, and is omied.)
Observe that this variant achieves a beer trade-o between S ,
T , and D. For instance, choosing δ0 = 1/10, α = 1/2, and β = 1/2,
yields S = 0.225N , T = 0.225, and D = 0.1.
Computation Cost: In this case, FastShare also has O (N logN )
computational cost, since constructing the signal takes O (N ) time
and the Fourier transform can be computed in O (N logN ) time
using an FFT. FastRecon has O (N logN ) computational cost with-
out requiring any parallelism. In particular, recovering the miss-
ing shares in a row (when arranged in the 2D-grid) can be done
in O
(
n20
)
= O
(
log2 N
)
complexity by leveraging that the rows
are Reed-Solomon codewords, which are evaluations of a degree-
(n0 − δ0n0 − 1) polynomial. Since there are O (N /logN ) rows, the
decoder to recover the missing shares has O (N logN ) complexity.
e second step is the inverse FFT, which also has O (N logN )
complexity.
4 FASTSECAGG BASED ON FASTSHARE
In this section, we present our proposed protocol FastSecAgg,
which allows the server to securely compute the summation of
clients’ model updates. We begin with a high-level overview of
FastSecAgg (see Fig. 5). Each client generates shares for its length-
L input (by breaking it into a sequence of dL/Se vectors, each of
length at most S , and treating each vector as S secrets) using Fast-
Share, and distributes the shares to N clients. Since all the com-
munication in FL is mediated by the server, clients encrypt their
shares before sending it to the server to prevent the server from
reconstructing the secrets. Each client then decrypts and sums
the shares it receives from other clients (via the server). e lin-
earity property of FastShare ensures that the sum of shares is a
share of the sum of secret vectors (i.e., client inputs). Each client
then sends the sum-share to the server (as a plaintext). e server
can then recover the sum of secrets (i.e., client inputs) with high
probability as long as it receives the shares from a random set of
clients of sucient size. We note that FastSecAgg uses secret shar-
ing as a primitive in a standard manner, similar to several secure
aggregation protocols [5, 11, 22].
FastSecAgg is a three round interactive protocol. See Fig. 5 for
a high-level overview, and Algorithm 2 for the detailed protocol.
Recall that the model update for client i ∈ C is assumed to be
ui ∈ ZLR , for some R ≤ q. In practice, this can be achieved by
appropriately quantizing the updates.
Round 0 consists of generating and advertising encryption keys.
Specically, each client i uses the key agreement protocol to gener-
ate a public-private key pair (pki , ski ) ← KA.gen(pp), and sends
their public key pki to the server. e server waits for at least N −D
clients (denoted as C0 ⊆ C), and forwards the received public keys
to clients in C0.
Round 1 consists of generating secret shares for the updates. Each
client i partitions their update ui into dL/Se vectors, u1i , u2i , . . .,
Client Server
Send public keys kpki
Round 0
Round 1
Round 2
Advertise
Keys
Generate
Shares
Reconstruct
the sum
sum shares
Generate
key pair
Generate encryption
〈kpki , kski 〉
Wait for enough clients C0 ⊆ C
Send the list of received
public keys to clients in C0
Send encrypted shares ci→j
Wait for enough clients C1 ⊆ C0
Forward received encrypted
shares to clients in C1
Decrypt the received shares
Compute the sum of shares
Send the sum share shi
Wait for enough clients C2 ⊆ C1
Reconstruct the sum of secrets
Compute shares of ui
using FastShare
Compute encrypted shares ci→j
using the shared key
using FastRecon
Figure 5: High-lever overview of FastSecAgg protocol.
u dL/S ei , such that the last vector has length at most S and all others
have length S . Treating each u`i as S secrets, the client computes N
shares as {(j, [u`i ] j )}j ∈C ← FastShare(u`i ,C) for 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se.
For simplicity, we denote client i’s share for client j as shi→j =
([u1i ] j | | [u2i ] j | | · · · | | [u dL/S ei ]j ).
In addition, every client receives the list of public keys from the
server. Client i generates a shared key ki, j ← KA.agree(ski , pkj )
for each j ∈ C0 \ {i}, and encrypts shi→j using the shared key
ki, j as ci→j ← AE.enc
(
ki, j , shi→j
)
. e client then sends all the
encrypted shares {ci→j }j ∈C0\{i } to the server.
e server waits for at least N − D clients to respond (denoted
as C1 ⊆ C0).5 en, the server sends to each client i ∈ C1, all
ciphertexts encrypted for it: {c j→i }j ∈C1\{i } .
Round 2 consists of generating sum-shares and reconstructing
the approximate sum. Every surviving client receives the list of
encrypted shares from the server. Each client i then decrypts the ci-
phertexts c j→i using the shared key kj,i to obtain the shares shj→i ,
i.e., shj→i ← AE.dec(kj,i , c j→i )wherekj,i ← KA.agree(skj , pki ).
en, each client i computes the sum (over Fq ) of all the shares
including its own share as: shi =
∑
j ∈C1 shj→i . Each client i sends
the sum-share shi to the server (as a plaintext).
e server waits for at least N − D clients to respond (denoted
as C2 ⊆ C1). Let sh`i denote the `-th coecient of shi for 1 ≤ ` ≤
dL/Se. e server computes {z` ,⊥} ← FastRecon
(
{(i, sh`i )}i ∈C2
)
,
5For simplicity, we assume that a client does not drop out aer initiating communica-
tion with the server, i.e., while sending or receiving messages from the server. e
same assumption is also made in [3, 9, 43]. is is not a critical assumption, and the
protocol and the analysis can be easily adapted if it does not hold.
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Algorithm 2 FastSecAgg Protocol
• Parties: Clients 1, 2, . . . ,N and the server
• Public Parameters: Update length L, input domain ZR , key agreement parameter pp ← KA.param(λ), nite eld Fq for FastShare
secret sharing with primitive N -th root of unity ω
• Input: ui ∈ ZLR (for each client i)
• Output: z ∈ ZLR (for the server)
• Round 0 (Advertise Keys)
Client i:
– Generate key pairs (pki , ski ) ← KA.gen(pp)
– Send pki to the server and move to the next round
Server:
– Wait for at least N − D clients to respond (denote this set as C0 ⊆ C); otherwise, abort
– Send to all clients in C0 the list {(i, pki )}i ∈C0 , and move to the next round
• Round 1 (Generate shares)
Client i:
– Receive the list {(j, pkj )}j ∈C0 from the server; Assert that |C0 | ≥ N − D, otherwise abort
– Partition the input ui ∈ ZLR into dL/Se vectors, u1i , u2i , . . ., u
dL/S e
i , such that u
dL/S e
i has length at most S and all others have
length S
– Compute N shares by treating each u`i as S secrets as {(j,
[
u`i
]
j )}j ∈C ← FastShare(u`i ,C) for 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se (by using
independent private randomness for each `); Denote client i’s share for client j as shi→j =
( [
u1i
]
j | |
[
u2i
]
j | | · · · | | [u
dL/S e
i ]j
)
– For each client j ∈ C0 \ {i}, compute encrypted share: ci→j ← AE.enc(ki, j , i | | j | | shi→j ), where ki, j = KA.agree(ski , pkj )
– Send all the ciphertexts {ci→j }j ∈C0\{i } to the server by adding the addressing information i, j as metadata
– Store all the messages received and values generated in this round and move to the next round
Server:
– Wait for at least N − D clients to respond (denote this set as C1 ⊆ C0)
– Send to each client i ∈ C1, all ciphertexts encrypted for it:
{
c j→i
}
j ∈C1\{i } , and move to the next round
• Round 2 (Recover the aggregate update)
Client i:
– Receive from the server the list of ciphertexts
{
c j→i
}
j ∈C1\{i }
– Decrypt the ciphertext (i ′ | | j ′ | | shj→i ) ← Dec(ski , c j→i ) for each client j ∈ C1 \ {i}, and assert that (i = i ′) ∧ (j = j ′)
– Compute the sum of shares over Fq as shi =
∑
j ∈C1 shj→i
– Send the share shi to the server
Server:
– Wait for at least N − D clients to respond (denote this set as C2 ⊆ C1)
– Run the reconstruction algorithm to obtain
{
z` ,⊥} ← FastRecon({(i, sh`i )}i ∈C2 ) for 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se, where sh`i is the `-th
coecient of shi ; Denote z = [z1 z2 · · · z dL/S e ]
– If the reconstruction algorithm returns ⊥ for any `, then abort
– Output the aggregate result z
for 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se. If the reconstruction fails (i.e., outputs ⊥) for
any `, then the server aborts the current FL iteration and moves to
the next one. Otherwise, it outputs z = [z1 z2 · · · z dL/S e ].
5 ANALYSIS
5.1 Correctness and Security
First we state the correctness of FastSecAgg, which essentially
follows from the linearity and D-dropout tolerance of FastShare.
e proof is given in D.
Theorem 5.1 (Correctness). Let {ui }i ∈C denote the client in-
puts for FastSecAgg. If a random set of at most D clients drop out
during the execution of FastSecAgg, i.e., |C2 | ≥ N − D, then the
server does not abort and obtains z =
∑
i ∈C1 ui with probability at
least 1 − 1/poly N , where the probability is over the randomness in
dropouts.
Next, we show that FastSecAgg is secure against the server
colluding with up to T clients in the honest-but-curious seing,
irrespective of how and when clients drop out. Specically, we
prove that the joint view of the server and any set of clients of
bounded size does not reveal any information about the updates of
the honest clients, besides what can be inferred from the output of
the summation.
We will consider executions of FastSecAgg where FastShare
has privacy threshold T , and the underlying cryptographic prim-
itives are instantiated with security parameter λ. We denote the
server (i.e., the aggregator) as A, and the set of of N clients as C.
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Clients may drop out (or, abort) at any point during the execu-
tion, and we denote with Ci the subset of the clients that correctly
sent their message to the server in round i . erefore, we have
C ⊇ C0 ⊇ C1 ⊇ C2. For example, the set C0 \ C1 are the clients that
abort before sending the message to the server in Round 1, but aer
sending the message in Round 0. Let ui ∈ ZLR denote the model
update of client i (i.e., ui the i-th client’s input to the secure aggre-
gation protocol), and for any subset C′ ⊆ C, let uC′ = {ui }i ∈C′ .
In such a protocol execution, the view of a participant consists
of their internal state (including their update, encryption keys, and
randomness) and all messages they received from other parties.
Note that the messages sent by the participant are not included in
the view, as they can be determined using the other elements of their
view. If a client drops out (or, aborts), it stops receiving messages
and the view is not extended past the last message received.
Given any subsetM ⊂ C, let REALC,T ,λM (uC ,C0,C1,C2) be a
random variable representing the combined views of all parties in
M∪{A} in an execution of FastSecAgg, where the randomness is
over the internal randomness of all parties, and the randomness in
the setup phase. We show that for any such setM of honest-but-
curious clients of size up to T , the joint view ofM ∪ {A} can be
simulated given the inputs of the clients inM, and only the sum
of the values of the remaining clients.
Theorem 5.2 (Security). ere exists a probabilistic polynomial
time (PPT) simulator SIM such that for all C, uC , C0, C1, C2, andM
such that M ⊂ C, |M| ≤ T , C ⊇ C0 ⊇ C1 ⊇ C2, the output of SIM
is computationally indistiguishable from the joint view REALC,T ,λM
of the server and the corrupted clientsM, i.e.,
REALC,T ,λM (uC ,C0,C1,C2) ≈ SIM
C,T ,λ
M (uM , z,C0,C1,C2), (14)
where
z =
{∑
i ∈C1\M ui if |C1 | ≥ N − D,
⊥ otherwise. (15)
e security and correctness of FastSecAgg critically relies on
the guarantees provided by FastShare proved in eorem 3.3. We
present the proofs of the above theorem in Appendices E.
5.2 Computation and Communication Costs
We assume that the addition and multiplication operations in Fq
are O (1) each.
Computation Cost at a Client: O (max{L,N } logN ). Each
client’s computation cost can be broken as computing shares using
FastShare which is O (dL/SeN logN ) = O (max{L,N } logN ); en-
crypting and decrypting shares, which is O (dL/SeN ); and adding
the received shares, which is O (dL/SeN ) = O (max{L,N }).
CommunicationCost at a Client: O (max{L,N }). Each client
sends and receives N −1 shares (each having dL/Se elements in Fq ),
resulting in O (dL/SeN ) = O (max{L,N }) communication. In addi-
tion, each client sends the sum-share consisting of dL/Se elements
in Fq .
Computation Cost at the Server: O (max{L,N } logN ). e
server rst recovers missing sum-shares using FastRecon, each has
dL/Se elements in Fq . is results in O (dL/SeN logN ) complexity.
e second step is the inverse FFT on N shares, each has of dL/Se
elements in Fq , resulting in O (dL/SeN logN ) complexity.
Communication Cost at the Server: O (N max{L,N }). e
server communicates N times of what each client communicates.
5.3 Comparison with Prior Works
Bonawitz et al. [9] presented the rst secure aggregation protocol
SecAgg for FL, wherein clients use a key exchange protocol to
agree on pairwise additive masks to achieve privacy. SecAgg, in the
honest-but-curious seing, can achieve T = αN for any α ∈ (0, 1)
and D = N −T − 1, and provides worst-case dropout resilience, i.e.,
it can tolerate any D users dropping out. However, SecAgg incurs
signicant computation cost of O (LN 2) at the server. is limits
its scalability to several hundred clients as observed in [8].
Truex et al. [45] uses threshold homomorphic encryption and
Xu et al. [47] uses functional encryptionto perform secure aggrega-
tion. However, these schemes assume a trusted third party for key
distribution, which typically does not hold in the FL setup.
e scheme by So et al. [43], which we call TurboAgg, uses
additive secret sharing for security combined with erasure codes
for dropout tolerance. TurboAgg allows T = D = αN for any
α ∈ (0, 1/2). However, it has two main drawbacks. First, it divides
N clients into N /logN groups, and each client in a group needs to
communicate to every client in the next group. is results in per
client communication cost of O (L logN ). Moreover, processing in
groups requires at least logN rounds. Second, it can tolerate only
non-adaptive adversaries, i.e., client corruptions happen before the
clients are partitioned into groups. On the other hand, FastSecAgg
results in O (L) communication per client, runs in 3 rounds, and
is robust against an adaptive adversary which can corrupt clients
during the protocol execution.
Recently, Bell et al. [3] proposed an improved version of SecAgg,
which we call SecAgg+. eir key idea is to replace the complete
communication graph of SecAgg by a sparse random graph to
reduce the computation and communication costs. FastSecAgg
achieves smaller computation cost than SecAgg+ at the server and
the same (orderwise) communication cost per client as SecAgg+
when L = Ω(N ). Moreover, FastSecAgg is robust against adap-
tive adversaries, whereas SecAgg+ can mitigate only non-adaptive
adversaries where client corruptions happen before the protocol
execution starts. On the other hand, SecAgg+ achieves smaller
communication cost in absolute numbers than FastSecAgg.
e performance comparison between FastSecAgg and SecAgg [9],
TurboAgg [43], and SecAgg+ [3] is summarized in Table 1.
ere are several recent works [24, 35, 42] which consider secure
aggregation when a fraction of clients are Byzantine. Our focus, on
the other hand, is on honest-but-curious seing, and we leave the
case of Byzantine clients as a future work.
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A FINITE FIELD FOURIER TRANSFORM
Here, we review the basics of the nite eld Fourier transform, for
details, see, e.g., [36]. Let q be a power of a prime, and consider a
nite eld Fq of order q. Let N be a positive integer such that N
divides (q − 1) and ω be a primitive N -th root of unity in Fq . e
discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of length N generated by ω is a
mapping from FNq to FNq dened as follows. Let x = [x0x1 . . . xN−1]
be a vector over Fq . en, the DFT of x generated by ω, denoted as
DFTω (x), is the vector over Fq , X = [X0 X1 . . .XN−1], given by
X j =
N−1∑
i=0
ωi jxi , j = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1. (16)
e inverse DFT (IDFT), denoted as IDFTω (X ), is given by
xi =
1
N
N−1∑
j=0
ω−i jX j , i = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1, (17)
where 1N denotes the reciprocal of the sum of N ones in the eld
Fq . We refer to x as the “time-domain signal” and index i as time,
and X as the “frequency-domain signal” or the “spectrum” and j as
frequency.
If a signal is subsampled in the time-domain, its frequency com-
ponents mix together, i.e., alias, in a paern that depends on the
sampling procedure. In particular, let n be a positive integer that
divides N . Let x (↓n) denote the subsampled version of x with period
n, i.e., x (↓n) = {xni : 0 ≤ i ≤ N /n − 1}. en, (N /n)-length DFT of
x (↓n), X (↓n), (generated by ωn ) is related to the N -length DFT of x ,
X , (generated by ω) as
X
(↓n)
j =
1
n
N−1∑
i=0
i mod (N /n)=j
Xi , j = 0, 1, . . . ,
N
n
− 1, (18)
where 1/n is the reciprocal of the sum of n ones in Fq .
A circular shi in the time-domain results in a phase shi in the
frequency-domain. Given a signal x , consider its circularly shied
version x (1) dened as x (1)i = x(i+1) mod N . en, the DFTs of x
(1)
and x (both generated byω) are related asX (1)j = ω
−jX j . In general,
a circular shi of t results in
X
(t )
j = ω
−t jX j , j = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1. (19)
B PROOF OF LEMMA
Proof of Lemma 3.2. For i ∈ {0, 1}, for v ∈ {0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1}, let
us denote x(v)(↓ni ) as x circularly shied (in advance) by v and
then subsampled by ni . at is, x(v)(↓ni )j = x(jni+v) mod ni for
j = 0, 1, . . . ,N /ni − 1. Let X(v)(↓ni ) denote the DFT of x(v)(↓ni )
generated by ωni . Now, from the aliasing property (18), it holds
that
X(v)(↓ni )c =
1
ni
N−1∑
j=0
j mod (N /ni )=c
X(v)j , (20)
for v = 0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1 and c = 0, 1, . . . ,N /ni − 1. However,
from the circular shi property (19), we have X(v)j = ω
−v jXj for
j = 0, 1, . . . ,N − 1. us, we have
X(v)(↓ni )c =
1
ni
N−1∑
j=0
j mod (N /ni )=c
ω−v jXj , (21)
for v = 0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1, and c = 0, 1, . . . ,N /ni − 1. Note that,
by construction, x(v)(↓ni ) is a length-(N /ni ) zero vector for v =
0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1 for each i ∈ {0, 1}. erefore, X (v)(↓ni ) is also
a length-(N /ni ) zero vector for v = 0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1 for each
i ∈ {0, 1}. Hence, from (21), we get
N−1∑
j=0
j mod (N /ni )=c
ω−v jX j =
ni−1∑
u=0
ω
−v
(
u Nni +c
)
Xu Nni +c
= 0, (22)
for v = 0, 1, . . . ,δini − 1, and c = 0, 1, . . . ,N /ni − 1. Simplifying
the above, we get
ni−1∑
u=0
(
ω
−uv Nni
)
Xu Nni +c
= 0, (23)
foru = 0, 1, . . . ,ni−1,v = 0, 1, . . . ,δini−1, and c = 0, 1, , . . . ,N /ni−
1.
C ANALYSIS OF FASTSHARE
We rst focus on the correctness, i.e., dropout tolerance. To prove
that FastShare has a dropout tolerance of D, we need to show
that FastRecon can recover the secrets from a random subset of
N − D shares. is is equivalent to showing that the iterative
peeling decoder of FastRecon can recover all the shares from a
random subset of N − D shares. Note that the shares generated by
FastShare form a codeword of a product code. From the density
evolution analysis of the iterative peeling decoder of product codes
in [27, 34], it follows that, when D ≤ (1 − (1 − δ0)(1 − δ1))N2 , the
decoder recovers all the shares from a random subset of N − D
shares with probability at least 1 − polyN . erefore, FastShare
has the dropout tolerance of D = (1 − (1 − δ0)(1 − δ1))N2 .
To prove the privacy threshold ofT , we consider the information-
theoretic equivalent of the security denition [7]. In particular, we
need to show the following: for any P ⊂ C such that |P | ≤ T , it
holds that H (s | {[s]i }i ∈P ) = H (s), where H denotes the Shannon
entropy. For simplicity, let us denote [s]i = Xi for all i . In the
remainder of the proof, we denote random variables by boldface
leers.
First, we show that the information-theoretic security condition
is equivalent to a specic linear algebraic condition. To this end,
we rst observe that the vector of N shares can be wrien as,
X = G
[
s
m
]
, (24)
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where s ∈ F`q is the vector of secrets, m ∈ FK−`q is a vector with each
element chosen independently and uniformly from Fq , and G is a
particular submatrix of the DFT matrix whose formal denition we
defer later on. We then show that information theoretic security is
equivalent to a particular linear algebraic condition on submatrices
of G . To prove this condition we leverage the fact that G is derived
from a DFT matrix and consider an alternate representation based
on the Chinese Remainder theorem (CRT). We furnish more details
while formally discussing the lemmas.
Recall that n0 and n1 are co-prime. By the CRT, we may conclude
that any number j ∈ {0, · · · ,N − 1} can be uniquely represented in
a 2D-grid as a tuple (a,b) where a = j mod n0 and b = j mod n1.
First, dene the set of indices
S = {(p0,p1) :
δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 ≤ p0 ≤ n0 − 1,
δ1n1 + β(1 − δ1)n1 + 1 ≤ p1 ≤ n1 − βn1(1 − δ1)}. (25)
Similarly, dene
Z0 = {(p0,p1) : 0 ≤ p0 ≤ δ0n0 − 1, 0 ≤ p1 ≤ n1 − 1}, (26)
Z1 = {(p0,p1) : 0 ≤ p0 ≤ n0 − 1, 0 ≤ p1 ≤ δ1n1 − 1}. (27)
For a pictorial representation of these indices, refer to Fig. 2. ese
sets correspond to points in the grid, and by the CRT map back to
integers in the range {0, · · · ,N − 1}.
Remark 2. In eorem 3.3, the number of secrets `, is chosen to be
equal to (1− α)(1− 2β)(1− δ0)(1− δ1)n0n1. By design this coincides
with the size of S.
With these denition, we next describe the construction of the
matrix G is obtained by starting with the N × N DFT matrix, re-
moving the columns corresponding to Z0 ∪ Z1, and permuting
the remaining columns so that the columns corresponding to S are
ordered as the rst ` columns in S (in arbitrary sequence).
Having dened the matrix G, in the following lemma we show
that information theoretic security can be guaranteed by a particu-
lar rank condition satised by submatrices of G. In particular, In
addition, dene K = N − |Z0 ∪Z1 |.
e proof is similar to Lemma 6 in [41], and thus omied.
Lemma C.1. Let s ∈ F`q , m ∈ Fk−`q , and X = G[s m]T be ran-
dom variables representing the secrets, random masks, and shares,
respectively. Let XP be an arbitrary set of shares corresponding to
the indices in P ⊂ {1, 2, . . . ,N }. Let GP denote the sub-matrix of G
corresponding to the rows indexed by P. Let GP = [G1 G2], where
G1 consists of the rst ` columns of GP and G2 consists of the last
K − ` columns of GP . If m is uniform over FK−`q , then it holds that
H (s) − H (s | XP ) ≤ rank(GP ) − rank(G2). (28)
Now, to prove the information-theoretic security, it suces to
prove that for any P of size at most T = αβ(1 − δ0)(1 − δ1)N ,
rank(G2) = rank(GP ). We prove this by showing that, for any D
with |P | ≤ T , the columns of G1 lie in the span of the columns of
G2. Note that columns of G1 are the columns of the DFT matrix
indexed by S.
Proof of rank(GP ) = rank(G2): Assume that {ω∂ : ∂ ∈ P} are
the set of primitive elements generating the rows of GP . For the
rest of the proof we are guided by the grid representation of g. 2 -
the Chinese remainder theorem (CRT) furnishes a representation
of the columns of GP , indexed by {0, · · · ,n − 1} as points on a
2D-grid, {(p0,p1) : p0 ∈ {0, · · · ,n0 − 1},p1 ∈ {0, · · · ,n1 − 1}}.
Notation: In the grid representation, consider the set of points
T in g. 2. Formally,
T = {(p0,p1) : δ0n0 ≤ p0 ≤ δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 − 1,
n1 − β(1 − δ1)n1 ≤ p1 ≤ n1 − 1}. (29)
Dene G2(T ) as the matrix G2 only populated by the columns
whose indices belong to T . Henceforth, we use the terminology
“points” to refer to a column of GP in its representation as a tuple
in the 2D-grid. Moreover we use the terminology “span” and “rank”
of the points to indicate the span and rank of the corresponding
columns. Consider a column index p ∈ {0, · · · ,n − 1} and ∆ ∈
{0, · · · ,n−1} where p 7→ (p0,p1) and ∆ 7→ (∆0,∆1) under the CRT
bijection. en, the notation (p0,p1) + (∆0,∆1) returns the point
((p0 + ∆0) mod n0, (p1 + ∆1) mod n1).
SinceGP is derived from a DFT matrix, this in fact corresponds to
multiplying the column corresponding to p by the matrix diag((ω∆
∂
:
∂ ∈ P)). e notations (i) p + ∆, (ii) p + (∆0,∆1) are dened
analogously. We also use the terminology “shi p horizontally by
∆0” and “shi p vertically by ∆1” to respectively denote p + (∆0, 0)
and p + (0,∆1). Given a set of points P, we overload notation and
use P + ∆ as the set of points {p + ∆ : p ∈ P}.
Observe that P + ∆ corresponds to multiplying the columns
indexed by P by a full-rank matrix. en, using the structure of
GP inherited from the DFT (Vandermonde) matrix structure, we
get the following result immediately.
Lemma C.2. If p ∈ span(P) for some set of points P, then for any
∆ ∈ {0, · · · ,n − 1}, p + ∆ ∈ span(P + ∆).
Proof. If p ∈ span(P) this implies that there exists weights
{αq : q ∈ P} such that for each ∂ ∈ P, ωp∂ =
∑
q∈P αqω
q
∂
. Fixing
any ∂ ∈ P, and multiplying both sides by ω∆
∂
,
ω
p+∆
∂
=
∑
q∈P αqω
q+∆
∂
=
∑
q∈P+∆ α
′
qω
q
∂
. (30)
Since this is true for each ∂ ∈ P the proof follows immediately. 
By construction of the set, observe that the number of points in
T equals αβ(1 − δ0)(1 − δ1)n0n1. Moreover, recalling the choice of
the privacy threshold T in eorem 3.3, observe that |T | = T . By
this fact, we have that rank(GP ) ≤ T . is implies two possibilities:
Case I. If rank(G2(T )) = rank(GP ), then the remaining columns
in G1 must lie in the span of G2(T ), and the proof con-
cludes.
Case II. If not, then the columns of G2(T ) must have at least one
column dependent on the others.
We can identify one such column by the following procedure:
starting at the top le corner of T in the grid, sequentially collect
the points in T in a top-to-boom, le-to-right sequence. Stop at
the rst point y = (y0,y1) which lies in the span of the previously
collected points (by assumption, such a point must exist as we are
in Case II). Figure 6 illustrates this procedure where we collect the
black points sequentially until the yellow point is reached which is
the rst point that lies in the span of the previously collected points.
Let B be dened as the set of black points which are enumerated
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Figure 6: Enumerating the columns in the bottom-right se-
quence until the rst column (yellow) is reached which lies
in the span of the previous columns
until y is found. By denition, this implies that there exist (not
necessarily unique) weights {αb }b ∈B such that,
ωy =
∑
b ∈B αbω
b (31)
is implies that y − (0, 1) ∈ span(B − (0, 1)). Dene Y as the set
of points,
Y = {(y0,θ ) : y1 − n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) + 1 ≤ θ ≤ y1}. (32)
Note that the set of points Y implicitly depends on the location of
point y. Next, we dene L and C to be the set of points,
L = ∪n0−y0−1k=0 (Y + (k, 0)) (33)
C ={(p0,p1) :
n0δ0 ≤ p0 ≤ y0,n1δ1 ≤ p1 ≤ n1 − 1}
∖ Y. (34)
In addition, we dene Q to be the set of points,
Q ={(p0,p1) :
n0δ0 ≤ p0 ≤ n0 − 1,n1δ1 ≤ p1 ≤ n1 − 1}
∖ L. (35)
Pictorially these points are represented in Figs 7 and 8.
Claim 1. Y ⊆ span(C).
Proof. We prove this result by induction sequentially iterat-
ing over all the points from top to boom in Y. Clearly B ⊆ C,
therefore the induction holds for the rst point in Y, which is
y = (y0,y1).
Suppose for some k ≥ 1 that for each t ≤ k −1 the pointy−(0, t)
lies in span(C). en we show that y − (0,k) ∈ span(C) as long as
k ≥ y1 − n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) + 1. Indeed, observe rst that,
y − (0,k) ∈ span(B − (0,k)). (36)
e key observation is thatB−(0,k) is always ⊆ C∪{y−(0, t) : 0 ≤
t ≤ k−1} (unlessk > y1−n1(1−δ1)(1−β)+1, in which caseB−(0,k)
shis far enough down that it includes points inZ1 - this has null
intersection with C and Y so the assertion is clearly false). For a
pictorial presentation of this fact, refer to Fig. 9. By the induction
hypothesis, for each t ≤ k − 1, y − (0, t) ∈ span(C). erefore,
span(B − (0,k)) ⊆ span(C). Plugging into eq. (36) completes the
proof of the claim. 
Claim 2. L ⊆ span(Q).
Proof. Recall thatL = ∪n0−y0−1k=0 (Y+(k, 0)). We follow a similar
proof by induction strategy as Claim 1 to result in the assertion. In
particular, for k = 0 the statement follows directly from the fact that
C ⊆ Q and using Claim 1 to claim thatY ⊆ span(C). Assuming the
induction hypothesis that for all 0 ≤ t ≤ k −1,Y+ (t , 0) ⊆ span(Q)
we show that Y + (k, 0) ⊆ span(Q) as long as k ≤ n0 − y0 − 1. In
particular, observe that from Claim 1,
Y + (0,k) ⊆ span(C + (0,k)). (37)
Next observe that unless k > n0 − y0 − 1,
C + (k, 0) ⊆ Q ∪ {Y + (t , 0) : 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1} (38)
if k > n0 − y0 − 1, then C + (k, 0) shis far enough that it wraps
around and include points inZ0 - this has null intersection with Q
and Y + (t , 0) for any t ≤ n0 − y0 − 1 and the assertion becomes
false. A pictorial representation of this fact is provided in Fig. 10.
By the induction hypothesis for each 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1, Y + (t , 0) ⊆
span(Q). Combining this fact with eqs. (37) and (38) implies that
Y + (0,k) ⊆ span(Q) and completes the induction step for k . 
Recall from eq. (33) thatL is dened as the set of points,∪n0−y0−1k=0 (Y+(k, 0)). More explicitly, noting that the set of points Y is dened as
{(y0,θ ) : y1 − n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) + 1 ≤ θ ≤ y1},
L = {(p0,p1) : y0 ≤ p0 ≤ n0 − 1,
y1 − n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) + 1 ≤ p1 ≤ y1}. (39)
Claim 3. e set of points S ⊆ L irrespective of the location of
the point y = (y0,y1) (note that the set of points L is a function of y0
and y1).
Proof. Before furnishing the details of the proof, note that a
pictorial representation of this statement is provided in Fig. 10.
First recall that y = (y0,y1) is a point in the set T . erefore,
δ0n0 ≤ y0 ≤ δ0n0+α(1−δ0)n0−1 andn1−β(1−δ1)n1 ≤ y1 ≤ n1−1.
In particular, this means that for any y,
(p0,p1) :
δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 − 1 ≤ p0 ≤ n0 − 1,
y1 − n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) + 1 ≤ p1 ≤ y1

⊆ L (40)
Furthermore, we see that (i) y1 ≥ n1 − β(1 − δ1)n1, and (ii) y1 −
n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) + 1 ≤ n1 − n1(1 − δ1)(1 − β) = n1δ1 + β(1 − δ1)n1.
erefore, we have that,
(p0,p1) :
δ0n0 + α(1 − δ0)n0 − 1 ≤ p0 ≤ n0 − 1,
n1δ1 + β(1 − δ1)n1 ≤ p1 ≤ n1 − β(1 − δ1)n1

⊆ L (41)
e LHS is exactly the denition of S in eq. (25). 
From Claims 2 and 3 and the denition of L in eq. (33), we see
that S ⊆ span(Q). In particular this implies that the each column
indexed by points in S can be expressed as a linear combination
of some set of remaining columns that do not belong toZ0 orZ1.
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Figure 7: Denition of B,Y and C
      
Figure 8: Denition of Q and L
is implies that for any choice of P (note that we do not specify a
particular choice of P in the proof as long as it has size ≤ T ) that
rank(G2) = rank(GP ).
Moreover, we do not specify the particular choice of P in the
proof, so it holds for all sets of size ≤ T .
D CORRECTNESS OF FASTSECAGG
Correctness essentially follows from the correctness of key agree-
ment and authenticated encryption protocols together with the
linearity and D-dropout tolerance of FastShare.
Specically, using the correctness of key agreement and authen-
ticated encryption, it is straightforward to show that, in Round 2,
each client i ∈ C1 computes and sends to the server the sum of
shares it receives in Round 1 as follows
shi =
©­«
∑
j ∈C1
[u1j ]i | | · · · | |
∑
j ∈C1
[u dL/S ej ]i
ª®¬ . (42)
Figure 9: Showing thatB−(0,k) is a subset of the intersection
of C and {y − (0, t) : 0 ≤ t ≤ k − 1}.
   
Figure 10: Showing that C + (k, 0) is a subset of the intersec-
tion of Q and ⋃k−1t=0 (Y + (t , 0)).
e linearity property of FastShare ensures that the sum of shares
is a share of the sum of secret vectors (i.e., client inputs). In other
words, by linearity of FastShare, it holds that
shi =
©­«

∑
j ∈C1
u1j
 i | | · · · | |

∑
j ∈C1
u dL/S ej
 iª®¬ . (43)
Recall that sh`i denotes the `-th coecient of shi . erefore, from (43),
it holds, for 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se, that
sh`i =

∑
j ∈C1
u`j
 i . (44)
Let C2 be a random subset of at least N −D clients that survive in
Round 2, i.e., clients in C2 send their sum-shares to the server. Now,
from (44) and the D-dropout tolerance of FastShare, it holds that
FastRecon
(
{(i, sh`i )}i ∈C2
)
=
∑
j ∈C1 u`j with probability at least
1 − 1/poly N for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se. Note that we do not need to
use a union bound here because if FastRecon succeeds (i.e., does
not output ⊥) for ` = 1, then it succeeds for each 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se,
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Figure 11: e S is indeed a subset of L. For the particular
choice of y this gure shows that the inclusion is true. More
generally we in construct S as the intersection of L over all
the possible locations of y ∈ T .
since the locations of missing indices (among N ) of shares for every
1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se are the same.
Hence, we get
[z1 z2 · · · Z dL/S e ] =

∑
j ∈C1
u1j
∑
j ∈C1
u2j · · ·
∑
j ∈C1
u dL/S ej

with probability at least 1− 1/polyN . In other words, z = ∑i ∈C1 ui
with probability at least 1 − 1/poly N . is concludes the proof.
E SECURITY OF FASTSECAGG
In FastSecAgg, each client i rst partitions their input ui to dL/Se
vectors u1i , u
2
i , . . ., u
dL/S e
i , each of length at most S , and computes
shares for each u`i , 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se. In other words, we have{(
j,
[
u`i
]
j
)}
j ∈C
← FastShare(u`i ,C), (45)
where independent private randomness is used for each 1 ≤ ` ≤
dL/Se. Let us denote the set of shares that client i generates for
client j as [ui ]j , i.e., we have
[ui ]j =
{[
u1i
]
j ,
[
u2i
]
j , . . . , [u
dL/S e
i ]j
}
. (46)
It is straightforward to show that for any set of up to T clients
P ⊂ C, the shares {[ui ]j }j ∈P reveal no information about ui .
Lemma E.1. For every ui , vi ∈ FLq , for any P ⊂ C such that |P | ≤
T , the distribution of {[ui ]j }j ∈P is identical to that of {[vi ]j }j ∈P .
Proof. Here we treat ui to be a random variable (with arbitrary
distribution), and {[ui ]j }j ∈P to be a conditional random variable
given a realization of ui . By slightly abusing the notation for sim-
plicity, denote ui as a set ui = {u1i , u2i , . . . , u dL/S ei } (instead of a
vector). Further, for simplicity, dene[
u`i
]
P = {[ui ]j }j ∈P ;
[
u`i
]
P =
{[
u`i
]
j
}
j ∈P
, 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se .
Now, observe that, given u`i , the distribution of
[
u`i
]
P is con-
ditionally independent of ui \ {u`i } and [ui ]P \
{[
u`i
]
P
}
. is
is because, for the `-th instantiation, 1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se, FastShare
takes only u`i as its input and uses independent private randomness.
erefore, the distribution of [ui ]P factors into the product of the
distributions of
[
u`i
]
P . e proof then follows by applying the
T -privacy property for each instantiation of FastShare. 
We prove eorem 5.2 by a standard hybrid argument. We
will present a sequence of hybrids starting that start from the real
execution and transition to the simulated execution where each
two consecutive hybrids are computationally indistinguishable.
Hybrid0 : is random variable is REAL
C,T ,λ
M (uC ,C0,C1,C2), the
joint view of the paritesM in the real execution of the protocol.
Hybrid1 : In this hybrid, we change the behavior of honest clients
in C1\M so that instead of usingKA.agree(ski , pkj ) to encrypt and
decrypt messages, we run the key agreement simulator SimKA(si, j , pkj ),
where si, j is chosen uniformly at random. e security of the key
agreement protocol guarantees that this hybrid is indistinguishable
from the previous one.
Hybrid2 : In this hybrid, for every client i ∈ C1 \ M, we replace
the shares of ui sent to other honest clients in Round 1 with zeros,
which the adversary observes encrypted as ci→j . Since only the
contents of the ciphertexts are changed, the IND-CPA security of the
encryption scheme guarantees that this hybrid is indistinguishable
from the previous one.
Hybrid3 : In this hybrid, for every client i ∈ C1 \ M, we re-
place the shares of ui sent to the corrupt clients inM in Round
1 with shares of vi , which are chosen as follows depending on z.
If z =⊥, then {vi }i ∈C1\M are chosen uniformly at random. Oth-
erwise, {vi }i ∈C1\M are chosen uniformly at random subject to∑
i ∈C1\M vi = z
(
=
∑
i ∈C1\M ui
)
. e joint view of corrupt par-
ties contains only |M| ≤ T shares of each vi . From Lemma E.1, it
follows that this hybrid is identically distributed to the previous
one.
If z =⊥, then we do not need to consider the further hybrids,
and let SIM is dened to sample from Hybrid3. is distribution
can be computed from the inputs z, C0, and C1. In the following
hybrids, we assume z ,⊥.
Hybrid4 : Partition z into dL/Se vectors, z1, z2, . . ., z dL/S e , each of
length at most S . In this hybrid, for every client i ∈ C2 \M and each
1 ≤ ` ≤ dL/Se, we replace the share sh`i with the i-th share of z` +∑
j ∈M u`j , i.e.,
[
z` +
∑
j ∈M u`j
]
i
. Since z =
∑
i ∈C1\M ui , from (43)
and (44), it follows that the distribution of
{[
z +
∑
j ∈M uj
]
i
}
i ∈C2
is identical to that of {shi }i ∈C2 . erefore, this hybrid is identically
distributed to the previous one.
We dene a PPT simulator SIM to sample from the distribution
described in the last hybrid. is distribution can be computed from
the inputs z, uM , C0, C1, and C2. e argument above proves that
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the output of the simulator is computationally indistinguishable
from the output of REAL, which concludes the proof.
F COMPARISON OF FASTSHAREWITH
SHAMIR’S SCHEME AND RELATION TO
LOCALLY RECOVERABLE CODES
Comparison with the Shamir’s scheme: A multi-secret sharing
variant of the Shamir’s scheme can be constructed as follows (see,
e.g., [16]). We consider the case of generating N shares (each in Fq ,
q ≥ N ) from S secrets (each in Fq ) such that the privacy threshold
is T and dropout tolerance is N − S −T . Construct a polynomial of
degree-(S +T − 1) with the secrets and T random masks (each in
Fq ) as coecients. Its evaluations on N distinct non-zero points in
Fq yield the N shares for the Shamir’s scheme.
Note that it is possible to recover the secrets from any S+T shares
via polynomial interpolation. Although there exist fast polynomial
interpolation algorithms that can interpolate a degree-n polynomial
in O
(
n log2 n
)
time (see, e.g., [10, 20, 25]), the actual complexity of
these algorithms is typically large due to huge constants hidden
by the big-Oh notation as noted in [10, 20, 30]. is limits the
scalability of such fast interpolation algorithms.
Since the shares generated by Shamir are evaluations of a degree-
(S+T −1) polynomial on N distinct non-zero points, it is easy to see
that the shares form a codeword of a Reed-Solomon code of block-
length N and dimension S + T . On the other hand, FastShare
constructs a polynomial of degree-(N − 1), and evaluates it on
primitive N -th roots of unity. e shares generated by FastShare
form a codeword of a product code with Reed-Solomon codes as
component codes (see Remark 1).
Suppose we choose primitive N -th roots of unity as the evalua-
tion points for the Shamir’s multi-secret sharing scheme. en, the
Shamir’s scheme essentially computes the Fourier transform of the
“signal” consisting of S secrets, concatenated withT random masks
followed by N − S −T zeros. In contrast, in case of FastShare, we
construct the signal by judiciously placing zeros, which ensures
the product code structure on the shares.
Relation to LRCs: e variant of FastShare described in 3.4
is related to a class of erasure codes called Locally Recoverable
Codes (LRCs) (see [21, 37, 44], and references therein). Specically,
consider LRCs with (`, r ) locality [37] in which coordinates can
be partitioned into several subsets of cardinality ` such that the
coordinates in each subset form a maximum distance separable
(MDS) code of length ` and dimension r . An ecient construction
of such LRCs is presented in [44, Section V-C]. Note that the shares
generated by FastShare (as described in 3.4) form codewods of
an LRC with (n0, (1 − δ0)n0) locality. Moreover, it is not dicult to
show that FastShare as an evaluation code is isomorphic to the
LRC constructed in [44, Section V-C] when the good polynomial is
x` (see [44, Sections III-A] for the denition of a good polynomial)
and the evaluation points are primitive N -th roots of unity.
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